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For nine years, a battle raged in Oklahoma contract law regarding whether
an arbitration clause in a contract is enforceable under the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion. The constitution grants individuals the right to trial by jury,' and indi-
viduals may waive that right.2 However, the constitution also provides that no
constitutional right may be waived by contract? Since arbitration clauses in
contracts typically preclude jury trials,' they are sometimes viewed as a waiver
of the right to a jury trial.' Thus it would seem that if an agreement to arbitrate
is indeed a waiver of the right to jury trial, an arbitration clause in a contract
would violate article XXIII, section 8 of the Oklahoma Constitution as
impermissibly waiving by contract a constitutional right.
Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court partially resolved the issue in
Rollings v. Thermodyne Industries, Inc.,6 by upholding an arbitration clause
under the Oklahoma Arbitration Act ("OAA"),7 the state's adoption of the Uni-
form Arbitration Act ("UAA"). s While the result in Rollings embraces the vast
public policy benefits of arbitration,9 it is somewhat incomplete in its constitu-
tional exegesis. Because the parties chose to argue that the right waived was
only one of access to the courts,'" and not the right to a jury trial," the deci-
sion does not answer the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate future
1. See OKLA. CONST. art. H, § 19 ("The right to trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate... ").
2. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 591 (1991) ("The trial by jury may be waived by the parties ...."). See
also Exparte Plaistridge, 173 P. 646, 647 (Okla. 1918) ("[W]here a trial by jury does not constitute an essen-
tial part of due process of law it may be waived by the party... ").
3. See OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 8 ("Any provision of a contract, express or implied, made by any
person, by which any of the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and void:).
4. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 796 P.2d 296, 296-97 n.1 (Okla. 1990) (setting forth
clause in contract requiring that "lalny controversy between you and the undersigned arising out of or relating
to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration .... [T]he award of the arbitrators, or of
a majority of them, shall be final... :').
5. In fact, every jurisdiction which has considered the question deems an arbitration clause to be such a
waiver. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
6. 910 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996).
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (1991).
8. UNF. ARBITRATION Acr §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1955).
9. See Rollings, 910 P.2d at 1036.
10. See id. at 1031.
11. The two rights are separately guaranteed in the Oklahoma Constitution. See OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 6 (guaranteeing the right of access to the courts and speedy and certain remedies for wrongs); OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 19 (guaranteeing the right to trial by jury).
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disputes violates article XXIII, section 8, as it pertains to the right to trial by
jury. As a result, the controversy is only partially resolved.
First, this comment will summarize the backdrop of cases associated with
the controversy. Secondly, it will examine the court's holding in Rollings. Addi-
tionally, it will offer an answer to the question of whether a right to a jury trial
is being waived by agreements to arbitrate, and if so, whether such agreements
violate article XXII, section 8.
HI. THE CASES
A. The Backdrop: Cases, 1988-1995
The issue of the constitutionality of agreements to arbitrate in Oklahoma
was first noted by Justice Opala in 1988, in his concurring opinion in Long v.
DeGeer 2 This case arose out of a securities account agreement executed in
1983 between Mary L. Long and Kidder, Peabody & Co." The agreement
stipulated that all controversies relating to transactions between the parties to
the agreement would be settled by arbitration. 4 In 1984, Long brought action
against Kidder, Peabody in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma alleging, among other things, fraudulent inducement,
misrepresentation, and fraudulent and/or negligent dealings regarding her ac-
count.' The court ordered these claims to be submitted to arbitration as stated
in the contract. 6
Following the order to arbitrate, Long re-filed suit in the Tulsa County
District Court naming her stockbroker, Bill DeGeer, as the sole defendant."7
This time, the trial court denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration; this
denial formed the basis for DeGeer's appeal. 8 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
reversed the denial of the motion, 9 holding that the language in the arbitration
clause applied to controversies involving Kidder, Peabody's agent as well as the
firm itself;' that Long had waived her right to a jury trial by signing the
agreement; and that public policy favors arbitration as a method of settling
disputes. '
Justice Opala concurred in the judgment, but viewed the case as an oppor-
tunity to issue a warning regarding the validity of arbitration agreements in
Oklahoma: "If Mary Long's arbitration agreement now in suit were to be con-
12. 753 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1988).
13. See id. at 1327-28.





19. See id. at 1330.
20. See id. at 1329.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1330.
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strued as an implicit waiver of her fundamental right to a trial by jury, then,
under... this state's fundamental law, her promise might be avoidable."'
However, Opala concurred in judgment because the contract in question was
not governed by Oklahoma law; but rather, it stipulated that New York law
would govern disputes.24
It is important to recognize that the condition that Opala places on the
unenforceability of arbitration agreements, that the promise to arbitrate indeed
be construed as a waiver of the right to a jury trial, was found by the court to
exist in Long.' As discussed below, one of the proposed solutions to the arbi-
tration clause problem involves viewing such promises as something other than
a waiver of rights.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to discuss the
arbitration clause problem again until it decided Cannon v. Lane' in 1993.
Mark Cannon, an employee of the State of Oklahoma, had entered into a mem-
bership agreement with PacifiCare, a health maintenance organization ("HMO")
which was contracted by the State of Oklahoma to care for state employees. 8
Cannon had sued PacifiCare in Tulsa County District Court seeking reimburse-
ment for hemorrhoid surgery and alleging bad faith by PacifiCare in refusing to
grant its approval for that surgery.29 Judge Donald C. Lane granted
PacifiCare's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the membership agree-
ment." Cannon applied to the supreme court for a writ of mandamus to com-
pel withdrawal of the order, or alternatively, a writ of prohibition of enforce-
ment of the order.3? ' The court issued the writ of prohibition because it held
that the HMO was similar enough to an insurance company so as to render the
contract as one with reference to insurance.32 The OAA does not provide for
the enforcement of arbitration agreements in insurance contracts.33
Once again, the court passed up the opportunity to rule on the ultimate
issue of whether an arbitration clause in a contract violates article XXIII, see-
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 1329. The Long court stated: "The agreement in this instance, on its face, evidences a clear
intent to submit any controversy between appellee and Kidder, Peabody, arising out of the existence of the
account or out of transactions on the account, to arbitration." Id.
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. 867 P.2d 1235 (Okla. 1993).
28. See id. at 1236-37.
29. See id. at 1236.
30. See id. Both the subscriber agreement and Pacificare's member handbook provided that claims relat-
ed to the performance of Pacificare would be settled by an arbitrator with the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. See Def.'s Application to Compel Arbitration at 2, Cannon v. Multimed Health Plan, No. 91-04279
(Tulsa County Dist. Ct. 1991).
31. See Cannon, 867 P.2d at 1236.
32. See id. at 1237.
33. See OKLA. STAT. it. 15, § 802 (1991). The section reads:
[The OAA] shall apply to a written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between
the parties. Such agreements are valid .... This act shall not apply to collective bargaining agree-
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tion 8 of the Oklahoma Constitution.34 The occasion did not slip by Justice
Opala, however, who issued another concurring opinion, this time joined by
Justice Watt, in which he expounded upon the unconstitutionality of such agree-
ments to arbitrate:
If I were writing today for the court's majority I would go much further.
My opinion would declare that all contracts which call for submission of
future controversies to arbitration are violative of Art. 23, § 8 and hence
unenforceable.... I would today pronounce as legally infirm all agree-
ments which require submission of any future controversy to arbitra-
tion.35
City of Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Board6 gave the supreme
court another opportunity to rule on agreements to arbitrate, this time in the
context of legislatively-mandated arbitration. In Bethany, the local office of the
International Association of Firefighters ("Union") had filed a complaint with
the Public Employees Relations Board ("Board") after negotiations with the
City of Bethany for a new collective bargaining agreement had failed, primarily
because the City wanted to preclude certain issues from arbitration under the
new contract.37 The Union contended, and the Board found, that such collec-
tive bargaining agreements could not legally include provisions removing cer-
tain claims from the scope of arbitration pursuant to title 11 section 51-111 of
the Oklahoma code, which provides that every item of certain types of public
employee contracts must be subject to arbitration." The Board issued an order
to prevent the City from bargaining in bad faith by insisting on illegal propos-
als.39 The court granted the order, and the City filed a petition for review by
the district court raising two issues: whether it violated a duty to bargain in
good faith by insisting that certain terms of the agreement would not be subject
to arbitration, and whether the statute requiring such arbitration is constitution-
ally valid.' The district court affirmed the Board's decision, and the City ap-
pealed, again raising both issues.4
The supreme court phrased the second issue so as to avoid addressing the
issue of whether an arbitration provision in a contract is violative of the Okla-
homa Constitution by focussing on the legislative mandate for arbitration: "Can
the Legislature create a method for dispute resolution which mandates arbitra-
tion.., in collective bargaining agreements without running afoul of the Okla-
34. See Cannon, 867 P.2d at 1240 (Opala, J., concurring) ("The court saves for another day the issue of
whether a contract for arbitration of future disputes is violative of Art. 23, § 8, Okl. Const.").
35. Id. at 1240-41.
36. 904 P.2d 604 (Okla. 1995).
37. See id. at 607.
38. See id. The statute governing contracts between municipalities and police officers or fire fighters,
states that: "Every [collective bargaining agreement] shall contain a clause establishing arbitration procedures
for the immediate and speedy resolution and determination of any dispute which may arise involving the
interpretation or application of any of the provisions of such agreement or the actions of any of the parties
thereunder." OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 51-111 (1991).
39. See Bethany, 904 P.2d at 607.
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homa Constitution?" 4 In so doing, the court not only managed to avoid the
arbitration clause controversy, but also found a convenient way to justify affir-
mance of the trial court since the legislature effectively preempted original
jurisdiction of these disputes at the trial court level by requiring arbitration.43
Thus, the legislature rendered as inappropriate for jury trial controversies which
arise out of police or fire fighter contracts,' and there is no waiver of a right
to jury trial since no right exists.
B. The Latest Jurisprudence: Rollings v. Thermodyne, Inc.4'
Although the decision in Bethany hinted that the court might uphold volun-
tary agreements to arbitrate, given Bethany's emphasis on constitutional provi-
sions favoring arbitration,' the court had not yet ruled on the issue of the con-
stitutionality of such voluntary agreements until this past spring, when the
Rollings decision was handed down. The case involved a dispute between the
patent-holder of a new type of industrial water heater, Bill Rollings, and the
contracted manufacturer of the water heater, Thermodyne.47 The contract stipu-
lated that arbitration would be used in dispute resolution.'
When such a dispute arose, Rollings began his assertion of rights by send-
ing repeated letters to Thermodyne, which apparently did not reach the result
that Rollings desired.49 He next filed suit in state district court, seeking the
termination of the contract and the prohibition of any further manufacture by
Thermodyne of water heaters using his design." Thermodyne moved to com-
pel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion, holding that the arbitration
clause in the contract was unconstitutional.' Relying on the article II, section
6 guarantee of access to the courts, the court held that Rollings could not have
waived such a right under article XXII, section 8.2 The court of appeals,
however, found differently. Since the OAA provides for judicial review of an
arbitrator's decision in a limited number of contexts, the court reasoned, access
to the courts was not completely denied to the parties. 3
It was this argument which eventually swayed the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. The court noted that "only if another part of the Constitution is breached
can [Article XXIII,] Section 8 be invoked,"54 meaning that by prohibiting the
ex contractu waiver of constitutional rights, section 8 depends on some right
42. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
43. For an explanation of the Legislature's power to determine what constitutes a "wrong" actionable at
a trial court, see generally St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Getty Oil Co., 782 P.2d 915, 918 (Okla. 1989).
44. See id. at 615 ("Mhe right to a jury trial depends on the nature of the dispute.").
45. 910 P.24 1030 (Okla. 1996).
46. See Bethany, 904 P.2d at 614. See also infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.







54. Id. at 1036.
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which is allegedly waived and which must first exist in another part of the
constitution. The court first focused on the access to courts provision of article
II, section 6. Examining other states, the court noted that most states had upheld
arbitration provisions in contracts despite guarantees in those states' constitu-
tions of access to the courts.55 The court further relied on the review provi-
sions of the OAA,5 which grant courts the powers to enforce arbitration provi-
sions, confirm arbitration awards, or even vacate an arbitrator's award on the
following bases: fraud, arbitrator's bias, unfair arbitration hearings, lack of a
valid agreement to arbitrate, or an arbitrator exceeding his or her power. 7 Be-
cause of the possibility of such review, the court held, the access to courts
provision of the constitution was not violated.5
The court next addressed the guarantee of "speedy and certain remedy
afforded for every wrong and for every injury," also found in article II, section
6. This guarantee "does not promise a remedy for every injustice," according to
the court; rather, it guarantees a remedy for those wrongs defined by the legis-
lature. 9 The legislature, then, determines what is or is not a "wrong." By en-
acting the OAA, the legislature has determined that a "wrong" exists to a party
to an arbitration agreement only where there exists "fraud, bias, excess of pow-
er, or unfair procedure."' What would have been a "wrong," had an arbitration
agreement not been signed, is no longer recognized. In Rollings, the alleged
dispute was within the scope of the arbitration agreement, and is thus outside
the purview of what the court considers a "wrong" for the purposes of section
6.6 Without a legally recognized "wrong," there is no need for a "speedy and
certain remedy," and thus, no violation of article II, section 6.
Synthesizing the two guarantees of section 6, those of access to the courts
and remedy for wrongs, the court concluded that there was no violation whatso-
ever of article II, section 6.2 Since no other constitutional benefit was alleged
by the parties to be waived by use of the arbitration agreement, 63 the court
held that there was no violation of article XXIII, section 8, and upheld the
arbitration agreement.'
However, as a result of the failure of the parties to so argue, the court
never thoroughly considered the possibility that other benefits of the constitu-
tion may have been waived by the arbitration agreement, especially the guaran-
teed right to a jury trial in article II, section 19. The court mentioned that the
arnicus curiae to the case, the Oklahoma Trial Lawyers' Association, did raise
the issue, but it disposed of the contention by recalling its decision in Bethany:
55. See id. at 1034-35.
56. See id. at 1033.
57. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 802 (1991).





63. See id. at 1031 n.1, 1036.
64. See id. at 1036.
[Vol. 32:163
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"[I]n City of Bethany v. PERB we held that mandatory arbitration... did not
violate Art. 2, § 19." Although the court did not develop a full analysis of
the article II, section 19 issue, the notion that facts such as those in Rollings
would be controlled by the Bethany decision is somewhat erroneous.
Bethany dealt with the arbitration of disputes between labor and manage-
ment in the context of civil service.' The statute involved, the Fire and Police
Arbitration Act,67 contains an affirmative grant of power to the labor unions
(the speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration, which is binding on manage-
ment) in return for denying those unions the right to strike.6" The right to a
jury trial of the dispute is denied by the legislature since the legislature deter-
mined that arbitration clauses in police and fire contracts are mandatory. This
type of denial of the right to a trial by jury amounts to a substantive denial: the
legislature has determined that trial by jury is not appropriate for solving dis-
putes between police or fire fighter unions and municipalities.
On the other hand, Rollings, and similar cases, such as Cannon, deal with
arbitration of a dispute relating to a contract which would normally be heard in
court. The right to trial by jury is forsaken by the signing of a contract. This
type of denial amounts to procedural denial: rather than determining that trial
by jury is inappropriate for a certain type of controversy, such as the inven-
tor/manufacturer dispute in Rollings,69 or the insurer/insured dispute in Can-
non,7 the legislature has decided that signing an agreement estops one from
bringing a controversy to a courtroom. Cases like Bethany are entirely different
from cases like Rollings. The former, a case deciding the constitutionality of
legislatively mandated grievance arbitration, cannot be brought to bear on the
latter, a case determining the constitutionality of voluntarily signed arbitration
agreements.
The cases, from Long to Rollings, illustrate an extensive effort by the court
to uphold arbitration clauses in contracts. As Rollings demonstrates, such claus-
es withstand a test against article XXIII, section 8 via article II, section 6, the
provision which guarantees access to courts and remedy for wrongs. However, a
court has still not decided whether arbitration clauses violate article XXIII,
section 8 via article II, section 19, which guarantees the right to trial by jury.
III. RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY: A PREDICrION
Should the court ever decide the question of whether an arbitration clause
is an unconstitutional waiver of the right to a jury trial, it will need to address
two questions: whether an arbitration clause in a contract is indeed a waiver of
65. Id. at 1031 n.1 (citing City of Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 904 P.2d 604, 607-08
(Okla. 1995)).
66. See Bethany, 904 P.2d at 607-08.
67. OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 51-111 (1985).
68. See id.
69. See Rollings, 910 P.2d at 1031.
70. See Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235, 1236 (Okla. 1993).
1996]
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a constitutional right; and if so, whether article XXIII, section 8 was intended to
preclude such a contractual waiver of a right to jury trial. Regarding the first
question, the court would probably find that by signing an agreement to arbi-
trate future disputes, an individual is in effect waiving a right to a trial by jury.
However, an affirmative answer to the second question is not so certain.
Although not dispositive of the issue, Bethany serves as a signpost in this re-
gard; the reasoning utilized by the court to uphold legislatively mandated arbi-
tration could be used to uphold voluntary arbitration clauses as well.7 Public
policy also favors arbitration,' and the court will probably stretch the law to
fit that policy. Additionally, the constitutional provision which purportedly bars
arbitration agreements may have been intended for another purpose.
A. Whether an Agreement to Arbitrate Involves a Waiver of Rights
In order to hold that an arbitration agreement is unconstitutional, the court
must first determine whether the issue does indeed involve a right to trial by
jury since the contractual waiver of such a right would be what, if anything, the
Oklahoma Constitution prohibits.' I One theory, advanced by Richard E.
Coulson of the Oklahoma City University School of Law, would hold that such
agreements do not constitute a waiver at all since there is no right to a jury trial
once an arbitration agreement is signed.74
Coulson bases his theory on the differences between legal and equitable
remedies.75 The UAA and the OAA both provide for the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate through the writ of specific performance,76 an equitable rem-
edy for which no right to a jury trial exists.' Once a party has been brought to
a court of law in a suit arising out of a contract, that party has the right to
counterclaim in equity for the specific performance of the arbitration clause in
the contract." The equitable issue of enforcement of the arbitration clause
71. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1994)
("inhere is a strong federal policy encouraging the expeditious and inexpensive resolution of disputes
through arbitration."). The advantages of arbitration have not escaped Oklahoma courts: "Ordinarily, agree-
ments of parties to bind themselves to mandatory arbitration are favored." Freeman v. Prudential Sec., Inc.,
856 P.2d 592, 594 (Okla. 1993). The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognizes that courts "generally look with
favor upon arbitration provisions as a shortcut to substantial justice with a minimum of court interference."
Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Okla. 1987).
73. In Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1987), Justice Opala noted: "If Mary Long's arbitration
agreement... were to be construed as [a] ... waiver of her fundamental right to a trial by jury, then, under
[Article XXII, section 8], her promise might be avoidable." Id. at 1330 (Opala, J., concurring).
74. See Richard E. Coulson, Is Contractual Arbitration An Unconstitutional Waiver of the Right to Trial
by Jury in Oklahoma?, 16 OKLA. Crry U. L. REv. 1 (1991).
75. See id. at 60.
76. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 803 (1991); UiF. ARBrrRATION AcT § 3, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1955). See also
Coulson, supra note 74, at 69.
77. See, e.g., Smith v. Ferguson, 622 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Okla. 1980) (holding that a jury is not required
as a matter of right in an equity action for the specific performance of a contract); Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of
Hwys. v. Martin, 572 P.2d 611, 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that actions for the specific performance
of a contract are of an equity character for which there is no right to a jury trial).
78. Cf Shaw v. Ferguson, 767 P.2d 1358 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (illustrating that a defendant/purchaser
in a breach of contract action may bring a counterclaim in equity against the plaintiff/vendor for specific
[Vol. 32:163
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would be resolved without a jury.79 Coulson focusses on the fact that the spe-
cific performance action has no right to a jury trial associated with it, and that
by extension, no right to a jury trial exists in any agreement which includes an
arbitration clause as well: "[T]here is no basis for a right to a jury trial when a
party seeks to compel arbitration .... Consequently such agreements do not
involve the waiver of any extant constitutional benefit.""0 The argument might
best be conceptualized in a circular fashion, putting forth that an agreement to
arbitrate is not a waiver of a right to a jury trial because any such right, if one
had existed, is waived upon the signing of the agreement and therefore ceases
to exist.
Specific performance of an arbitration clause differs from the legal resolu-
tion of a substantive claim relating to a contract; the former is an equitable
claim,"' while the latter is legal in nature. 2 Thus, while use of a jury would
not be appropriate to decide whether to issue a writ of specific performance of
an arbitration clause, a jury would be used to determine legal rights under the
contract. A suit for damages, then, carries with it the right to a jury trial while
the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate does not. 3 However, one party's
right to a jury trial for decisions of facts relating to substantive claims for relief
exists independently of the right of the other party to pursue a writ of specific
performance in a court of equity.8" The court cannot order specific perfor-
mance of an agreement which might be unconstitutional without first deciding
whether the remedy sought violates the constitution. The fact that the legislature
provided for the writ of specific performance by directing the courts to enforce
arbitration agreements 5 does not settle the matter. Invoking the legislative act
would merely shift the target of the unconstitutionality allegation from the indi-
vidual arbitration clause at issue to the specific performance provisions of the
OAA in general. Thus, to order the parties to arbitration through a writ of spe-
cific performance would require an equity court to consider two fundamental
constitutional questions: whether an agreement to arbitrate represents a contrac-
tual waiver of rights, and if so, whether it is prohibited by article XXIII, section
8 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
The mere existence of the equitable remedy of specific performance does
not answer the penultimate question of whether a right to jury trial has been
waived because the granting of that writ would partially turn on whether or not
the right had been waived. Rather, it is the resolution of the constitutional ques-
performance of the real estate contract).
79. Cf. Smith, 622 P.2d at 1087.
80. Coulson, supra note 74, at 78.
81. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 16, Topic 3 Introductory Note (1971).
82. See, e.g., Roadway Express v. Gordon, 277 P.2d 146, 151 (Okla. 1954) (illustrating that a dispute
over sums due on an account is a question for the fact finder); Busboom v. Smith, 191 P.2d 198, 201 (Okla.
1948) (explaining that a case over a balance due on an account is a jury case).
83. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (1971).
85. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 802 (1991).
1996]
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tions presented that will determine whether the equitable remedy of specific
performance is available in the arbitration clause context.
If the court were to decide whether an agreement to arbitrate is a waiver of
the right to a jury trial, the court would decide in the affirmative. Many of the
other forty-nine states have considered this question, and all of these jurisdic-
tions have decided that such a clause is indeed a waiver of constitutional
rights.8 6 The federal courts agree, holding that by sending a dispute to an arbi-
trator, the Seventh Amendment remains inviolate if an arbitration clause is in
force." More importantly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has considered the
question on occasion,88 and in each instance has decided that an arbitration
clause in a contract suffices as a waiver of the right to trial by jury.89 It is
proper to conclude, then, that the court would answer the first of the two funda-
mental questions by holding that a party entering into a contractual agreement
which stipulates that disputes will be resolved by an arbitrator has, in effect,
waived the right to jury trial.
B. Whether Such a Waiver is Prohibited by the Oklahoma Constitution
Although not a necessary component of its decision, the court in Bethany
hinted that article XXIII, section 8 was not intended by the drafters of the Okla-
homa Constitution to preclude agreements to arbitrate."° Indeed, it is difficult
86. See Coulson, supra note 74. Coulson asserts that "apparently in all states, but Oklahoma, a contract
providing for future arbitration is viewed as impliedly waiving a constitutional or statutory right to a jury
trial." Id. at 69. Research indicates, however, that while many of the states have decided the issue of whether
an agreement to arbitrate is a waiver of the right to jury trial, not all states have. The jurisdictions which have
ruled on the issue, however, have all found in the affirmative, that is, that arbitration agreements are indeed
waivers of the right to trial by jury. See, e.g., Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 604
So. 2d 332 (Ala. 1991); Diedrich v. City of Ketchikan, 805 P.2d 362 (Alaska 1991); Broemmer v. Abortion
Serv. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992); Lawrence v. Walzer & Gabrielson, 256 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989); Ekereke v. Obong,
462 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. 1995); Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 788 P.2d 164 (Haw. 1990); Courter v. Simpson
Constr. Co., 106 N.E. 350 (I1. 1914); Jackson v. DeFabis, 553 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Johnson v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 272 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1978) (Reynoldson, J., concurring); McKinstry v. Valley
Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, P.C., 380 N.W.2d 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc.,
452 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1990); Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921); Molodyh v.
Truck Ins. Exch., 714 P.2d 257 (Or. C. App. 1986); Forte Bros., Inc. v. State Dep't of Transp., 541 A.2d
1194 (R.I. 1988); Fourakre v. Perry, 667 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. CL App. 1983); Massey v. Galvan, 822 S.W.2d
309 (Tex. CL App. 1992).
87. See Gelderman, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1987);
Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir. 1985). See also National Iranian Oil Co. v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (stating that federal policy favoring arbitration requires
strict construction of arbitration agreements by the courts).
88. One might wonder why, while considering the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate is a waiver
of a jury trial, the court has never considered if such a contractual waiver would be constitutional. Many of
these decisions are from before 1967, during which time the Oklahoma Constitution contained an explicit
provision allowing contractual agreements to arbitrate to function as a waiver of the right to jury trial notwith-
standing article XXIII, section 8. See OKLA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 20 (repealed 1967). The cases which come
after 1967 do not answer the constitutional question, in my opinion, either because the court wished to avoid
the issue, or because the issue was never raised by the parties.
89. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 796 P.2d 296, 300 (Okla. 1990); Long v. DeGeer,
753 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Okla. 1987). In both cases it was unnecessary for the court to discuss whether the waiv-
er by contract was unconstitutional; the contract in question in each case had a New York choice-of-law pro-
vision. See Dean Witter Reynolds, 796 P.2d at 297; Long, 753 P.2d at 1330. Long is treated in more detail
supra Part II.A. Dean Witter Reynolds is treated in more detail infra Part VI.A.
90. See City of Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 904 P.2d 604, 614 (Oka. 1993). See also
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to imagine that a clause prohibiting arbitration agreements would exist in a
constitution which so clearly favors arbitration in certain circumstances.9 In
fact, the legislative history of the Oklahoma Constitution reveals that article
XXIII, section 8 was not intended to prohibit parties from waiving their right to
a jury trial by entering into agreements to arbitrate future disputes.'
Article XXIII, section 8 has its roots in the Colorado, Montana, and Wyo-
ming Constitutions.93 The sections from which Oklahoma's section 8 is de-
rived each have a scope which is much narrower than Justice Opala's suggested
interpretation of the Oklahoma provision.94 The Colorado provision on which
section 8 is based forbade employers to require employees to sign waivers of
the employer's liability in case of a work-related injury." The Wyoming Con-
stitution went further; it voided all waivers of liability for injuries sustained in
the scope of employment, whether signed as a condition of employment or
not." The Montana provision was substantially similar to that of the Colorado
Constitution.'
Furthermore, although article XXIII of the Oklahoma Constitution is enti-
tled "Miscellaneous," most of the sections therein deal with labor and employ-
ment issues. 8 Robert Williams, in his history annotation to section 8, directs
Dean Witter Reynolds, 796 P.2d at 302 (Kauger, J., concurring) ("Article 23, § 8 was not intended nor should
it be construed to preclude arbitration.").
91. See infra notes 105-09, 112 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
93. See ROBERT L. WnLi ms, THE CONSTrrtuON OF OKLAHOMA AND ENABLING AcT, ANNOTATED,
WITH REFERENCES TO THE CONTIUION, STATUTES, AND DECISIONs 301 (1941); Coulson, supra note 74, at
69-70 n.402.
94. See Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Okla. 1993) (Opala, J., concurring). Justice Opala's opin-
ion, once again, is that section 8 prohibits any contractual waiver of any constitutional right. See id.
95. See COLO. CONsT. art. XV, § 15, reprinted in CHARLES KErLEBOROUGH, THE STATE CONsTrru-
TIONS AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITTMON AND ORGANIC LAWS OF THE TERRITORIES AND OTHER COLONIAL
DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERCA, COMPILED AND EDrrED 222 (1918). The section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or corporation to require of its servants or
employ6s, as a condition of their employment or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby such
person, company, or corporation shall be released or discharged from liability or responsibility on
account of personal injuries received by such servants or employ6s while in the service of such per-
son, company or corporation by reason of the negligence of such person, company, or corporation, or
the agents or employds thereof; and such contracts shall be absolutely null and void.
Id.
96. See WYO. CoNsT. art. X, § 4, reprinted in KETLEBOROUGH, supra note 95, at 1542 ("Any contract
or agreement with any employee waiving any right to recover damages for causing the death or injury of any
employee shall be void.").
97. See MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (repealed 1972), reprinted in KETLEBOROUGH, supra note 95, at
841-42. This section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or corporation to require of its servants or em-
ployees, as a condition of their employment or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby such
persons, company, or corporation, shall be released or discharged from liability or responsibility on
account of personal injuries received by such servants or employees while in the service of such
person, company or corporation, by reason of negligence of such person, company or corporation, or
the agents or employees thereof; and such contracts shall be absolutely null and void.
Id.
98. See OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 1-10, 12. Section 1 prescribes maximum hours of labor on public
work, section 2 prohibits the contracting of convict labor, section 3 restricts labor by children under age 15,
section 4 restricts employment underground, section 5 covers health and safety concerns in certain occupa-
dons, section 7 prohibits waivers of employers' liability, section 10 places limitations on the salaries of public
officials, and section 12 deals with retirement. Section 11 was repealed, so, of the ten sections (besides sec-
tion 8) in article XXIII, eight focus on employment. See id. See also Coulson, supra note 74, at 69-70.
11
Zini: The Arbitration Clause Controversy in Oklahoma
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:163
the reader back to article XXIII, section 7 for additional source material." This
section holds that the cause of action for wrongful death shall never be elimi-
nated, and that the damages awarded in such a cause of action should not be
limited."° In this respect, the Oklahoma Constitution parallels that of Wyo-
ming; 0 ' the Wyoming provision on which Oklahoma's section 8 is based is
also preceded by language accomplishing the same goal as Oklahoma's section
7.' In all three of the constitutions which are ancestral to section 8, the arti-
cle in which the provision lies deals with corporations, employers, or labor."'
The history of article XXIII, section 8 is reflected in the application of the
section, for the article has never been construed to render a contract void other
than in a dispute related to injuries sustained during employment." Therefore,
it is a plausible theory that section 8 was not intended to prohibit all contractual
waivers of constitutional rights, agreements to arbitrate, or even agreements to
arbitrate in employment-injury matters, but rather, to prohibit agreements to
waive employer's liability in workers' compensation suits. After all, arbitration
is mentioned in the Oklahoma Constitution in three separate contexts:' ° first,
prohibiting the legislature from interfering with the decisions of an arbitrator
through the passage of procedural laws;" second, creating a Board of Arbi-
tration within the Department of Labor; re and third, mandating stipulations in
corporate charters to submit all labor disputes to arbitration."8 The Bethany
court reasoned that because arbitration is so specially recognized within the
99. See W=LLAMs, supra note 93, at 301.
100. See OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 7 ("The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in
death shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limita-
tion . ... '.")
101. See WYO. CONST. art. X, § 4, reprinted in KErLEBOROUGH, supra note 95, at 1542. Wyoming
includes the following language immediately before the language prohibiting waiver of employer's liability:
"No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of
any person." Id.
102. Note that in the Wyoming Constitution, the provisions are combined into one section. See WYo.
CONST. art. X, § 4. In the Oklahoma version, however, the two ideas are given separate treatment. See OKLA.
CoNST. art. XXIII, §§ 7-8. The fact remains, however, that in both constitutions these provisions immediately
precede each other.
103. The Colorado and Wyoming articles are entitled: "Corporations." See COt.O. CONsT. art. XV; WYo.
CONST. art. X. The Montana provision is headed: "Corporations Other Than Municipal." See MoNT. CONST.
art. XV.
104. See, e.g., Pine Belt Lumber Co. v. Riggs, 193 P. 990, 996 (Okla. 1920) (forbidding employee to
release employer from liability for injuries). Compare Shoenfelt v. Donna Belle Loan & Inv. Co., 45 P.2d
507, 510 (Okla. 1935) (relieving lender from liability to borrower is valid for the purpose of preventing litiga-
tion).
105. See City of Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 904 P.2d 604, 614 (Okla. 1993).
106. See OKLA. CoNST. art. V, § 46 ("The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing: ... Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or
changing the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings or inquiry before... arbitrator[s] or other tribu-
nals... -).
107. See OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 21 ("The Legislature shall create a Board of Arbitration and Concilia-
tion in the Department of Labor and the Commissioner of Labor shall be ex-officio chairman.").
108. See OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 42 ("Every license issued or charter granted to a mining or public ser-
vice corporation... shall contain a stipulation that such corporation will submit any difference it may have
with employees in reference to labor, to arbitration, as shall be provided by law.").
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Oklahoma Constitution, it is difficult to imagine that the drafters intended the
same constitution to prohibit arbitration."°
The Bethany case, of course, involved the resolution of employment griev-
ances,"' which are specifically addressed in relation to arbitration in article
IX, section 42."' This might distinguish the reasoning employed to reach the
decision in Bethany from that which would be used in other types of cases. But
the court summed up its analysis of the constitutional mention of arbitration by
generalizing to all types of arbitration, whether employment-related or not: "The
framers, at a minimum, did not preclude legislatively-mandated grievance arbi-
tration."". This deliberate phrasing of the decision leaves the door open for
expansion of the application of the constitutional interpretations employed in
Bethany. With this open-ended language, the court may now extend its views to
cover arbitration agreements which are not legislatively mandated, or which are
not related to employment.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A DECISION AGAINST ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Were the court to actually decide that clauses in contracts providing for
arbitration do violate article XXIII, section 8 of the Oklahoma Constitution, the
impact on the state would be dramatic. Certain principles of public policy, such
as the promotion of fairness and equality in the bargaining process, might be
supported by such a decision. However, public policy has also come to favor
alternative methods of dispute resolution in the last decade,"' and a decision
which holds arbitration agreements unconstitutional would clearly contravene
public policy in this regard.
A. Fairness and Equality in Bargaining
Courts have consistently been reluctant to enforce those contracts which
demonstrate terms favoring one party to the contract, and an inequality of bar-
gaining power which disfavors the other party."4 Since article XXIII, section
8 is a protection of rights, it would seem that a literal reading and strict en-
forcement of the section would support a policy of striving for fairness in bar-
gaining. After all, if an arbitration clause in a contract is unenforceable on its
face, it prevents the inclusion of such a clause in an adhesion or unconscionable
contract."5 Consequently, parties who desire arbitration would not be able to
109. See Bethany, 904 P.2d at 614.
110. See id. at 607.
111. See supra note 108.
112. Bethany, 904 P.2d at 614 (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., City of Muskogee v. Martin, 796 P.2d 337, 340 (Okla. 1990) (expressing federal court
policy preferring arbitration).
114. See RESTAThmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 208 (1979). The Uniform Commercial Code gives
courts three options when a contract includes such a term: to refuse enforcement of the contract, to enforce
the contract without the unfair term, or to limit the application of that term in order to avoid an unfair result.
See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1995).
115. An adhesion contract is one in which one party's will is imposed on the other party, who either
1996]
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"force" the procedure on individuals who do not want to waive their right to a
jury trial but who have no meaningful choice other than to sign the con-
tract."16 Therefore, to hold all arbitration clauses as unenforceable might be a
way to protect the public from being forced into a procedure which might be
disfavorable.
However, an adhesion contract must have terms which unreasonably favor
the party with the greater bargaining power in order to be unconscionable, and
therefore, unenforceable."' While parties who are commonly involved in liti-
gation, such as large corporations, might have more experience and wider lati-
tude in selecting an arbitration panel than the average citizen, there is no other
advantage to either party which is inherent in the arbitration process."8 Sever-
al courts have held that since an arbitration provision is not inherently unfair,
the presence of an arbitration clause in a contract is not a term which unreason-
ably favors one of the parties."' Even in adhesion contracts, then, an arbitra-
tion clause does not render the contract unconscionable.' Summarily, there is
seldom an injustice from which it is necessary to protect the public simply
because a contract contains an arbitration provision.
Furthermore, a ruling that arbitration provisions in contracts are unenforce-
able is not necessary to protect potential victims of unfairness in the bargaining
process because the rules governing contract formation still apply.' While
substantive rights under the contract would be determined by an arbitrator, the
decision of whether or not to enforce the arbitration clause still belongs to the
courts." An arbitration clause which is unfair, such as one which gives the
unwillingly or unwittingly accepts a unfavorable term during contract formation. See MARTIN A. FREY ET AL.,
AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACTS AND RESTnUnON 209-10 (2d ed. 1993). Unconscionability, which often
accompanies a contract of adhesion, exists when the unfavorable term is unreasonable. See id. at 210.
116. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C, Cir. 1965) (explaining
that lack of meaningful choice is one of the criteria for deeming a contract unconscionable).
117. See id. at 449 ("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaning-
ful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party.... In many cases, the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bar-
gaining power."). See also Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(stating that the contract should be reviewed in light of the circumstances at time contract was made);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960) (stating that contractual provisions injurious
to the public in some way will be declared void as against public policy); I ARTuaH LINTON CORBIN, CON-
TRACrs § 128, at 551-55 (1963) (discussing unconscionable bargains).
118. See Ditto v. RE/MAX Preferred Properties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1000, 1002-04 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that where the contract gives one party unreasonable power in determining who will arbitrate the
dispute, however, the agreement is unfair).
119. See Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 1986); Hall v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 662 F. Supp. 468, 471 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Sharpe v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 46,
47 (BNA) (D. Minn. June 13, 1988).
120. See generally William G. Phelps, Annotation, Pre-Emption by Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.S.
§§1 et seq.) of State Laws Prohibiting or Restricting Formation or Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements,
108 A.L.R. FED. 179, § 5 (1994) (explaining that the particular provision at issue must be unconscionable).
121. See, e.g., Universal Plumbing & Piping Supply, Inc. v. John C. Grimberg Co., 596 F. Supp. 1383,
1384-85 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Duplan Corp. v. W. B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86, 87-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Phelps, supra note 120, at § 3.
122. The Federal Arbitration Act, for example, directs courts to enforce arbitration agreements, "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The
Oklahoma Arbitration Act parallels the federal statute: "[Arbitration] agreements are valid ... except upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 802
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parties unequal power in determining the composition of the arbitration panel,
may still be struck down by the courts as unenforceable due to unconsciona-
bility if there is unequal bargaining power accompanying the unfair term."
While a decision rendering arbitration clauses unenforceable might ostensibly be
seen as a result of a policy promoting fairness in the bargaining process, such a
decision would neither effectively promote fairness in bargaining nor be neces-
sary to achieve that result. Certainly, in light of the benefits to the public of
alternative dispute resolution, 4 any public policy considerations which favor
the unenforceability of arbitration clauses are minimal.
B. The Public Policy Benefits of Arbitration
American public policy on arbitration has shifted from disfavoring arbitra-
tion agreements in general, to disfavoring only those agreements that provide
for the arbitration of future controversies, to favoring all arbitration
agreements." In the 1874 case of Insurance Co. v. Morse,"as the United
States Supreme Court took a skeptical view of arbitration, stating that the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements might substantially interfere with the ad-
ministration of justice. In fact, prior to the adoption of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act ("FAA") in 1925, courts generally looked with disfavor on arbitra-
tion agreements, holding that public policy forbade specific performance there-
of.29
Since the earlier part of this century, however, American courts have come
to embrace arbitration. Crowded dockets and lengthy trials encouraged many
jurisdictions to adopt arbitration statutes, and, as long as the dispute to be re-
solved was present, and not future, public policy began to favor arbitration
agreements. 3 In the 1952 case of Wilson v. Gregg,' the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court struck down an arbitration agreement because it called for the
arbitration of future controversies.'32 The court recognized that agreements to
(1991).
123. See Ditto v. RE/MAX Preferred Properties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Okla. 1993). The court was
confronted with an action to enforce an arbitration agreement in which one of the parties would have no voice
in selecting the arbitrators. See id. at 1001-02. The court refused to uphold the agreement, holding that such
an agreement "conflicts with [the court's] fundamental notions of fairness, and tends to defeat arbitration's
ostensible goals of expeditious and equitable dispute resolution." Id. at 1004.
124. See infra Part V.B.
125. See Lauri Newton, Comment, Arbitration and Antitrust: A Leg Up for International Arbitration
[Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985)], 25 WASHBuRN LJ. 536,
536-37 (1986). See also Henry C. Strickland, Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson: Widespread Enforce-
ment of Arbitration Agreements Arrives in Alabama, 56 ALA. LAW. 238, 238-39 (1995).
126. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
127. See id. at 452.
128. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
129. See In re Phalberg, Bulk Carriers Corp. v. Kasmu Laeva Omanikud, 43 F. Supp. 761, 762 (S.D.N.Y.
1942). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (declaring Congress' motivation for pass-
ing the FAA was to mandate enforcement, by the states, of arbitration agreements).
130. See, e.g., Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921); Deal v. Thompson, 151 P.
856 (Okla. 1915).
131. 255 P.2d 517 (Okla. 1952).
132. See id. at 519.
19961
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arbitrate present disputes had been enforced by the courts on a regular basis by
this time, but held that agreements to arbitrate controversies which might arise
in the future were contrary to public policy because they deprive the courts of
jurisdiction.'
The drafters of the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955 sought to eliminate
this reluctance on the part of courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate future
disputes. Clauses requiring the arbitration of future disputes, as well as those in
the present, are enforceable in jurisdictions, including Oklahoma, that have
enacted the UAA' 34 Public policy has evolved accordingly; courts now "gen-
erally look with favor upon arbitration statutes and contracts as a shortcut to
substantial justice with a minimum of court interference."'35 In fact, the sup-
port for arbitration has become so strong that when an arbitration provision
exists, there is a presumption favoring the enforcement of that agreement. 36
Public policy, then, has shifted from disfavoring arbitration to favoring it
as a means of resolving controversies. The reasons for the change are clear:
arbitration speedily determines disputes and controversies by "quasi judicial
means, thus avoiding the formalities, the delay, the expense, and the vexation of
ordinary litigation."''
To understand fully the benefits of arbitration as a method of dispute reso-
lution, one need only examine the case of Mark Cannon, the plaintiff who
successfully challenged the arbitration clause in his health maintenance agree-
ment.' After being denied coverage by PacifiCare, Cannon sued the insur-
ance company.'39 The case was dismissed by Judge Lane because of the arbi-
tration provision."4 Cannon appealed, won, and the case was remanded to the
trial court. 4' During trial, PacifiCare pleaded that Cannon had failed to ex-
haust some administrative remedies, and once again moved for dismissal.'
While the trial judge was deciding that motion, Cannon and PacifiCare came to
terms on a settlement process, one that would be administered by a third par-
ty." And, after almost five years of litigation, Cannon and PacifiCare reached
an agreement.'"
133. See id.
134. See UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr § 1, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1955) ("[A] provision in a written contract to submit
to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevoca-
ble. . . .') (emphasis added).
135. Association of Classroom Teachers of Okla. City, Inc. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 89 of Okla.
County, 540 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Okla. 1975). See also Freeman v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 856 P.2d 592, 594
(Okla. Ct. App. 1993) ("Ordinarily, agreements of parties to bind themselves to mandatory arbitration are fa-
vored.").
136. See, e.g., Wolverine Exploration Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 842 P.2d 352, 353-54
(Okla. Ct. App. 1991).
137. 3 AM. JUR. Arbitration and Award § 2 (1936).
138. See Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235 (Okla. 1993).
139. See id. at 1236.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1240.
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The irony of the Cannon situation is, of course, that after striving to strike
the arbitration process down in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Cannon ultimate-
ly resolved his controversy through alternative dispute resolution. Five years
later, the settlement procedure employed reached a decision that an arbitrator
would likely have come up with anyway. It is cases like this which highlight
the need for enforcement of arbitration clauses in contracts in Oklahoma.
Although holding arbitration clauses in contracts violative of the Oklahoma
Constitution may arguably protect the public from unfair bargaining practices,
there already exist mechanisms for the public's protection. Furthermore, there is
nothing inherently unfair about arbitration provisions. Instead, such a holding
would possibly deprive Oklahomans of the benefits of contractual arbitration as
a method for resolving disputes.
VI. CIRCUMVENTING A DECISION RENDERING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
UNENFORCEABLE
Although the court will likely, in the light of the legislative history of the
section, decide that article XXIII, section 8 does not render arbitration agree-
ments unenforceable, 45 there is still the chance that the court will interpret the
section literally. If the court chooses to do so, there are methods which might
be employed to enforce arbitration agreements notwithstanding the court's deci-
sion.
A. Choice of Law Provisions
A provision that a contract will be governed by the laws of a state or terri-
tory other than Oklahoma might succeed in taking the arbitration clause out of
the ambit of article XXIII, section 8. In his concurring opinion to Long, Justice
Opala conceded that the arbitration provision in Long's contract with Kidder,
Peabody, and Company should be upheld notwithstanding the Oklahoma Con-
stitution because he could not "conclude that Mary Long's arbitration agreement
[was] governed by Oklahoma law."'"
Justice Opala tempered the choice-of law argument with his opinion in
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear.'47 On appeal, Warren Shear sought to
reverse the trial court's enforcement of his contract by asserting that the choice-
of-law provision, which called for New York law, should not be enforced.'"
Since Shear did not raise the choice-of-law issue at the trial court level, the
court found that he could not raise the issue on appeal.149 However, in so rul-
ing, the court noted that a challenge to the choice-of-law provision might suc-
ceed if a party was able to establish that "(a) application of the chosen state's
145. See supra Part HJ.
146. Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Okla. 1988).
147. 796 P.2d 296 (Okla. 1990).
148. See id. at 298.
149. See id. at 299.
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legal system [was] 'contrary to a fundamental policy' of the state with the ma-
terially greater interest in determining the question at hand and (b) the laws of
the latter state would govern in the absence of an effective choice of law."''
In that case, Oklahoma law would still apply, and the question of whether the
arbitration clause violates the Oklahoma Constitution would still need to be ad-
dressed.
It is not likely that a challenge to a choice-of-law provision calling for
another state's law would succeed, however, because such a challenge would
probably fall the first part of the test for two reasons. First, part (a) of the test
requires that one state have a "materially greater interest" than the chosen
state.' Since parties may not arbitrarily choose one state's law over another,
but must opt for the law of a state which has some substantial relationship to
the transaction or the parties involved,'52 both the chosen state and the forum
state would have some interest in the resolution of the dispute.' It is doubtful
whether the standard of "materially greater interest" could be satisfied.' 4 Cer-
tainly in Dean Witter Reynolds, wherein one of the parties had the chosen state
as its principal place of business,'55 it could not be said that Oklahoma had a
materially greater interest than that of New York, the chosen state.
Second, part (a) of the test set out in Dean Witter Reynolds also requires
that "'application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a funda-
mental policy' of a state with a materially greater interest.'56 While there re-
mains a controversy on whether arbitration clauses in contracts violate the Okla-
homa Constitution, it could not be successfully argued that arbitration is con-
trary to state public policy in Oklahoma. The constitution, as noted above, does
embrace arbitration in three separate contexts.'57 Furthermore, Oklahoma
courts have held recently that public policy favors arbitration because it pro-
vides a method of solving disputes without resorting to the courts.'58
150. Id. at 298-99 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187-188 (1971)).
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICt OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971) ("The law of the state cho-
sen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied.., unless ... application of
the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially great-
er interest ... .
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971). The law of the chosen state
will govern unless "the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction." Id. See
also Moore v. Subaru of Am., 891 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1989). Oklahoma's choice of law rules for contracts
include the application of the law chosen by the parties, the law of the state in which the contract was entered
into, or the place of performance of the contract if that place is indicated in the contract. See id. at 1449.
153. See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. M & L Inv., 10 F.3d 1510, 1514 (10th Cir. 1993) (explain-
ing that a state which is a principal place of business of one of the parties has a material interest in the trans-
action); Equifax Serv., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1360 (10th Cir. 1990) (requiring that in an employment
contract, the state which is the principal place of business of the employer has an interest in the transaction).
154. See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Bros., 10 F.3d at 1514; Equifax, 905 F.2d at 1360.
155. See Dean Witter Reynolds, 796 P.2d at 299.
156. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). See also Moore, 891 F.2d at 1449 (10th Cir. 1989). In
Moore, this was applied to invoke Oklahoma law even though the contract provided for the application of
Arkansas law because the contract, which was a loan-receipt agreement, was void according to Oklahoma
statutory law. See id.
157. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 46; art. VI, § 21; art. IX, § 42. See also supra notes 106-08 and accom-
panying text.
158. See Freeman v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 856 P.2d 592 (Okla. CL App. 1993). See also Association of
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Therefore, a choice of law provision should successfully remove the arbi-
tration clause from the effects, if any, of article XXIII, section 8, of the Oklaho-
ma Constitution. As long as the chosen state does have a substantial relation-
ship to either the transaction or the parties to the contract, an arbitration provi-
sion in that contract should be enforced by Oklahoma courts.159
B. Invocation of Federal Law"6°
An even more effective method of precluding the application of any Okla-
homa law invalidating arbitration agreements would be to invoke federal law.
The Federal Arbitration Act" will govern in any case which evidences an ef-
fect on interstate commerce. Section 2 of the Act provides that a provision in a
contract calling for arbitration for the resolution of disputes will generally be
upheld if the transaction is one involving commerce, unless there exists grounds
for the revocation of the contract as a whole. 62 In Southland Corp. v.
Keating," the leading case on enforceability of arbitration agreements
through the FAA in the face of state law which is contrary to such enforcement,
the United States Supreme Court recognized two limitations on the enforceabili-
ty of arbitration provisions through the Act."
First, the Court noted that the arbitration provision "must be part of... a
contract 'evidencing a transaction involving commerce.""' 65 Section 1 of the
Act defines commerce as "commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia
[and] any State or Territory or foreign nation."'5 This section also explicitly
excludes "contracts of employment of... any.., class of workers engaged in
Classroom Teachers of Okla. City, Inc. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 89 of Okla. County, 540 P.2d 1171,
1176 (Okla. 1975) ("[Alrbitration... [provides] a shortcut to substantial justice with a minimum of court
interference.").
159. It appears that any of the other forty-nine states will do; Oklahoma's constitution is the only one
which has a provision against contractual waivers of rights as broadly stated as article XXIII, section 8. See
Dean Witter Reynolds, 796 P.2d at 301 (Kauger, J., concurring) (expressing that Oklahoma's article XXIII,
section 8 is unique).
160. This section will primarily deal with the application of the Federal Arbitration Act codified at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994). However, there is additional federal law, besides the FAA, that provides for arbitra-
tion in specific types of controversies and that would also override state law that seeks to avoid the enforce-
ment of an arbitration clause. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1994), applied
in NLRB v. Roswil, Inc., 55 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995). See also Dean Witter Reynolds, 796 P.2d at 301
(Kauger, J., concurring) (suggesting that the application of the Labor Management Relations Act would over-
ride any Oklahoma law which refused to enforce the arbitration provision in question in that case).
161. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
162. See id. § 2. The section reads:
A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
163. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
164. See id. at 10.
165. Id. at 11.
166. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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foreign or interstate commerce,"'67 but this provision has been limited to
workers employed in transportation industries. s
The Act exercises authority to the full extent that Congress has the power
to regulate under the Constitution. 9 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies,
Inc. v. Dobson,7 ' the Supreme Court held that the words "involving com-
merce" in section 2 of the FAA are the functional equivalent of the phrase
"affecting commerce,'' which, at the time,' had been established by the
Court as the test for whether Congressional action is proper under the Com-
merce Clause." This commerce requirement for congressional action has
been interpreted broadly throughout the latter part of this century; as long as the
activity being regulated, such as the signing of a contract in Allied-Bruce, has
an effect on interstate commerce, Congress has the authority to regulate the
activity. 7 Recently, the commerce power has been slightly limited in United
States v. Lopez,75 but it appears that as long as the activity being regulated is
indeed commercial, Congress still has the authority to regulate it, even if it is
an intrastate activity. Since contracts are, by their nature, commercial, Con-
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir.
1984). Cf. Conley v. San Carlo Opera Co., 163 F.2d 310, 311 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that an entertainer who
travelled across state lines successfully avoided arbitration provision because no interstate commerce was
found; not because the contract was one of employment). But see Mittendorf v. Stone Lumber Co., 874 F.
Supp. 292, 295 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that FAA does not govern employment contracts).
169. See U. S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .
170. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
171. See id. at 840. The court also held that the scope of the FAA is broader than "'only persons or activ-
ities within the flow of commerce."' Id. at 839 (quoting United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus.,
422 U.S. 271, 276 (1975)).
172. This test has been modified slightly by the court's ruling in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995). The basic adjustment has been a move from "affecting" to "substantially affecting" commerce. See id.
at 1630. By extension, the Allied-Bruce court would hold today that "involving commerce" is the functional
equivalent of "substantially affecting commerce." The Lopez decision is treated more fully infra notes 175-76
and accompanying text.
173. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Congressional
exercise of the commerce power to pass a statute is proper when Congress has determined that an activity
affects interstate commerce, and the courts need only inquire whether Congress' finding is rational. See id. at
277. The commerce power extends to intrastate activities which affect interstate commerce. See id. The court
must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce. See id. at 276. See
also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
174. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (holding that a restaurant affects
interstate commerce when it offers food to interstate travelers); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-28
(1942) (holding that production and consumption of home-grown wheat affected interstate commerce).
175. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
176. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, asserted that Congressional power to regulate com-
merce should be reduced from the regulation of that which "affects" commerce to that which "substantially
affects" commerce. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630. His application of that "new" standard, however, seems to
cover all activities which are commercial in nature. Lopez struck down a federal statute prohibiting the posses-
sion of handguns in school zones, but Rehnquist held that other Court decisions which upheld congressional
regulation of economic activities were indeed decided correctly, no matter how slim the nexus between the
economic activity and interstate commerce: "Examples include the regulation of intrastate coal mining ...
intrastate extortionate credit transactions ... and production and consumption of home-grown wheat ... "
Id. at 1630 (emphasis added). That the activity regulated be economic, then, appears to be the requirement for
Congressional action.
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gress has the power to regulate them, and the FAA will apply in the vast major-
ity of disputes.
The second limitation recognized by the Court in Southland is that no
grounds may exist for the revocation of the contract."7 This limitation will
apply in situations where a rule of contract formation has been violated; for
example, whether a written arbitration provision added onto a written confirma-
tion of an already existing oral contract is valid,178 or whether a boilerplate ar-
bitration provision on the back of a contract is considered part of the contract
under state law.'79 However, this limitation will not render arbitration agree-
ments invalid simply because state law prevents the formation of such agree-
ments. 8° Such a proposal was rejected by the Southland majority because to
adopt it would allow states to override the declared policy in favor of arbitra-
tion with statutory provisions to the contrary.'
Once the FAA is deemed applicable in a controversy, its effect is to com-
pletely preclude the application of state law to the determination of whether or
not an arbitration agreement is enforceable."s In Southland, owners of 7-Elev-
en franchises sued Southland, the franchisor, in California state court, claiming
fraud, misrepresentation, and violations of the California Investment Disclosure
Law, among other allegations.' The California Supreme Court had reinstated
a ruling by the trial court, which had been reversed on the first appeal, that the
arbitration provisions in the franchise agreement were unenforceable.'84 The
United States Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the FAA pre-
empted the application of state law to the arbitration agreement through the
Supremacy Clause8 . of the United States Constitution.8 6 In so doing, the
Court stated that by passing the FAA, Congress had "declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to re-
solve by arbitration."'8 7
There were two factors involved in the Court's decision to pre-empt state
law by the FAA. First, the Court noted that to fail to uphold the FAA in state
court cases would be to promote forum shopping,'88 which is actively discour-
aged by the federal courts. 9 Second, the Court asserted that since Congress
177. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.11.
178. See, e.g., Supak & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1979).
179. See, e.g., Universal Plumbing & Piping Supply, Inc. v. John C. Grimberg Co., 596 F. Supp. 1383
(W.D. Pa. 1984).
180. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.1l.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 10-11.
183. See id. at 4.
184. See id. at 5.
185. See U. S. CONST. art. 6, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
186. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 17.
187. Id. at 10.
188. See id. at 15-16.
189. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938). One of the twin aims of Erie is to discourage
19961
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extended the effect of the statute to all contracts evidencing a transaction "in-
volving commerce," it was Congress' clear intent to make the FAA binding on
the states.' 90 In any contract which affects interstate trade, then, state courts
have no choice but to enforce an arbitration clause.
The applicability of the FAA to most disputes almost renders the arbitra-
tion clause controversy in Oklahoma moot. In her concurring opinion to Dean
Witter Reynolds, Justice Kauger recognized that Oklahoma law could not have
been used to defeat the arbitration provision at issue since the FAA would have
preempted application of the Oklahoma Constitution. 9' Further, in his concur-
ring opinion in Rollings, Justice Opala stated that he would uphold the arbitra-
tion agreement in that case through the FAA although, in his opinion, it was
invalid against the Oklahoma Constitution."9 When a transaction in a contract
has an effect on interstate commerce, the FAA applies. Because, upon enacting
the FAA, Congress "declared a national policy favoring arbitration," any arbi-
tration agreement which falls under the rubric of the FAA will be enforced in
the vast majority of circumstances.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is probable that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will have the opportunity
to decide whether arbitration clauses violate article XXII, section 8 of the
Oklahoma Constitution in the near future. Given the legislative history of the
section, and the overwhelming public policy considerations which support
agreements to arbitrate, it is likely that the court will answer in the negative.
However, if the court does choose to invalidate arbitration agreements, the vast
majority of them will still be enforceable through the application of federal law
or the addition of a choice-of-law provision to the contract. The controversy
raised by Justice Opala presents the Oklahoma Supreme Court with two choic-
es; however, it seems that it will not make much difference which choice the
court selects.
Gregory R. J. Zini
forum shopping. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965).
190. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 ("Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut
the enforceability of arbitration agreements.").
191. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 796 P.2d 296, 301 (Okla. 1990) ("If federal law is impact-
ed, state law is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act .... "). See also Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that state law is preempted by the FAA).
192. See Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1038 (Okla. 1996).
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